Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions

Bernard Lebrun ()

Working Papers from York University, Department of Economics

Abstract: If the value cumulative distribution functions are log-concave at the highest lower extremity of their supports, a simple geometric argument establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the first-price auction in the asymmetric independent private value model.

JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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http://econ.yorku.ca/research/workingPapers/working_papers/2004/lebrunb-u.pdf First version, 2004

Related works:
Journal Article: Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions (2006)
Working Paper: Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yca:wpaper:2004_2

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