Union militancy and the probability of strikes

Elie Appelbaum

Working Papers from York University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper provides a model that explains the probability of strikes by the union's use of militancy as a strategic tool in bargaining. Militants are useful because they provide a credible threat, hence enhancing the union's bargaining position. Using a multi-stage bargaining game, we show that, in general, militants will be used by the union as a strategic tool. The strategic benefit of militancy is reflected by the fact that the wage and employment level will be higher in a union that uses militants, compared to a union that does not. We use the model to show that the level of militancy and the probability of a strike decrease with the union's power. This suggests that policies that increase the strength of the union will have, at least, a partial positive effect on social welfare. We also show that the model can be viewed as providing an equilibrium of a repeated game, an interpretation that can explain the probability of strikes even in the absence of militants.

Keywords: Strategic Militancy; Strikes; Credible Threats; Union Power; Labour Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 J51 J52 J53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yca:wpaper:2004_4

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