Zheng’s Optimal Mechanism with Resale and the Second-Price Auction

Bernard Lebrun ()

Working Papers from York University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that Zheng (2002)’s optimal mechanism in the presence of resale can be interpreted as an equilibrium of an ascending-price auction and, in the two-bidder case, as an equilibrium with a no-regret property of the English and second-price auctions. We also show that it can be extended beyond Zheng (2002)’s original assumptions

Keywords: Zheng’s mechanism; optimality; resale; second-price auction; independent private values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yca:wpaper:2006_6

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