Correlated Nash Equilibrium

Kin Chung Lo

Working Papers from York University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Nash equilibrium presumes that players have expected utility preferences, and therefore the beliefs of each player are represented by a probability measure. Motivated by Ellsberg-type behavior, which contradicts the probabilistic representation of beliefs, we generalize Nash equilibrium in n-player strategic games to allow for preferences conforming to the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18 (1989), 141–153]. With no strings attached, our equilibrium concept can be characterized by the suitably modified epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Agreeing to disagree; Correlated equilibrium; Epistemic conditions; Knightian uncertainty; Multiple priors; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2007-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Correlated Nash equilibrium (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yca:wpaper:2007_5

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