The Dynamics of Hate and Violence

Elie Appelbaum

Working Papers from York University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides a simple dynamic model that explores the interdependence and dynamic properties of hate, violence and economic well-being. It shows that a time-dependent economic growth process that affects the evolution of hate can yield a long run steady state, but this steady state will not be free of hate and violence. Moreover, we show that better (long run) economic conditions do not necessarily result in lower equilibrium levels of hate and violence. We show that, under reasonable conditions, cycles of hate and violence cannot occur and consequently, the dynamics of hate and violence in itself cannot give rise to cyclical patterns of (net) economic well-being. While both stable and unstable equilibria are possible, the most likely equilibrium is unstable (a saddle point). Using a linear example, we show that instability becomes more likely with an increases in the: responsiveness to economic condition and violence; willingness to forgive; marginal cost of violence and “length†of a country’s m

Keywords: Hate; Violence; Dynamics; Steady State; Stability; Genuine Peace (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2013-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yca:wpaper:2013_01

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