INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY ON THE DOMAIN OF SINGLEPEAKED PREFERENCES

Semin Kim
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Semin Kim: Yonsei University

No 2016rwp-96, Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute

Abstract: We consider incentive compatible voting rules on the domain of single-peaked preferences. In the environment where the value distributions are generic in the set of independent beliefs, we show that every incentive compatible rule satisfies the tops-only property.

Keywords: Incentive compatibility; Single-peaked preferences; Tops-only property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D01 D02 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9pages
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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