Interim Self-Stable Decision Rules
Daeyoung Jeong and
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Daeyoung Jeong: The Bank of Korea
Semin Kim: Yonsei University
No 2017rwp-108, Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute
This study identi es a set of interim self-stable decision rules. In our model, individual voters encounter two separate decisions sequentially: (1) a decision on the change of a voting rule they are going to use later and (2) a decision on the nal voting outcome under the voting rule which has been decided from the prior procedure. A given decision rule is self-stable if any other possible rule does not get enough votes to replace the given rule under the given rule itself. We fully characterize the set of interim self-stable decision rules among weighted majority rules with given weights.
Keywords: Weighted majority rules; decision rules; self-stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yon:wpaper:2017rwp-108
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