The Central Influencer Theorem: Spatial Voting Contests with Endogenous Coalition Formation

Subhasish Chowdhury and Sang-Hyun Kim

No 2021rwp-193, Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute

Abstract: We analyze a spatial voting contest without the “one person, one vote” restriction. Players exert continuous influence effort and incurs cost accordingly. They can be heterogeneous in terms of position, disutility function, and cost function. In equilibrium, two groups endogenously emerge: players in one group try to implement more leftist policy, while those in the other group more rightist one. Since the larger group suffers more severe free-riding problem, the equilibrium policy does not converge to the center if the larger group does not have a cost advantage. We demonstrate how the location of the center (i.e., the steady-state point) depends the convexities of the utility and cost functions. We extend the model to a dynamic setting.

Keywords: Spatial Competition; Contest; Lobbying; Median Voter Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23pages
Date: 2021-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic, nep-ore, nep-pol and nep-upt
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Working Paper: The Central Influencer Theorem: Spatial Voting Contests with Endogenous Coalition Formation (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yon:wpaper:2021rwp-193

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