Prosecution Associations in Industrial Revolution England: Private Providers of Public Goods?

Mark Koyama

Centre for Historical Economics and Related Research at York (CHERRY) Discussion Papers from CHERRY, c/o Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: In early 19th century England there was no professional police force and most prosecutions were private. This paper examines how associations for the prosecution of felons arose to internalise the positive externalities produced by private prosecutions. Drawing upon new historical evidence, it examines how the internal governance and incentive structures of prosecution associations enabled them to provide public goods. Consistent with Demsetz (1970), prosecution associations were economic clubs that bundled the private good of insurance with the public good of deterrence. Associations used local newspapers to advertise rewards and attract new members. Price discrimination was employed in order to elicit contributions from individuals with di erent security demands. Selective incentives helped overcome to free-rider problems between members.

Keywords: public goods; private prosecutions; insurance selective incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 N43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Prosecution Associations in Industrial Revolution England: Private Providers of Public Goods? (2012)
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