Game Theory Via Revealed Preferences

Indrajit Ray () and Lin Zhou

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: We investigate equilibrium notions in game theory from the revealed preference approach. For extensive game forms with complete information, we derive a set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for the observed outcomes to be rationalized by subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-gth and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2000/0015.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Game Theory via Revealed Preferences (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:00/15

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paul Hodgson ().