Convertible Subordinated Debt Valuation and "Conversion in Distress"

Marco Realdon

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: This paper presents new formulae for the valuation of convertible debt and shows how it can be rational for convertible holders to convert not only when the debtor's equity value increases, ut also when the debtor approaches distress. Even if debt cannot be enegotiated, "conversion in distress" averts costly bankruptcy. If ankruptcy costs are high, neglecting "conversion in distress" may ntail a significant undervaluation of subordinated convertibles. Conversion in distress" makes convertible debt less sensitive than on-convertible debt to the recovery value of assets in bankruptcy. So onvertible financing can reduce the cost of borrowing when lenders are symmetrically informed about the debtor's assets recovery value.

Keywords: Subordinated convertible debt; Default; Bankruptcy costs; "Conversion in distress" (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G13 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-rmg
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