EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

What Price Compromise? Testing a Possibly Surprising Implication of Nash Bargaining Theory

John Bone, John Hey and John Suckling

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: This paper identifies, and tests experimentally, a prediction of Nash Bargaining Theory that may appear counterintuitive. The context is a simple bargaining problem in which two players have to agree a choice from three alternatives. One alternative favours one player and a second favours the other. The third is an apparently reasonable compromise, but is in fact precluded as an agreed choice by the axioms of Nash Bargaining Theory. Experimental results show that agreement on this third alternative occurs rather often. So the axiomatic Nash theory is not well-supported by our evidence. Our subjects' behaviour could be interpreted as the paying of an irrationally (according to the Nash theory) high price in order to reach a compromise agreement.

Keywords: Experiments; Nash Bargaining Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2006/0618.pdf Main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: What Price Compromise? Testing a Possibly Surprising Impliction of Nash Bargaining Theory Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:06/18

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paul Hodgson ().

 
Page updated 2024-07-13
Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:06/18