On Credible Coalitional Deviations by Prudent Players

Anindya Bhattacharya and Abderrahmane Ziad

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: In this paper we first explore the predictive power of the solution notion called conservative stable standard of behaviour (CSSB), introduced by Greenberg (1990) in environments with farsighted players (as modelled in Xue (1998)) as intuitively it is quite nice. Unfortunately, we find that CSSB has a number of undesirable properties. Therefore, we introduce a refinement of this which we call conservative stable weak predictor. We explore some existence properties of this new solution.

Keywords: Coalitions; stable behaviour; perfect foresight (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players (2012)
Working Paper: On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:09/33

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