A Non-empty Core May Not Coincide with the Uncovered Set in Spatial Voting Situations

Anindya Bhattacharya, V Brosi and F Ciardiello

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: In this note it is shown that in contradiction to the well-known claim in Cox (AJPS, 1987) (repeated in a number of subsequent works), the uncovered set in a spatial voting situation does not necessarily coincide with the core even when the core is non-empty.

Keywords: spatial voting models; uncovered set; core; stable set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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