An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders

Adolphus Talman and Zaifu Yang

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: An auctioneer wishes to sell several heterogeneous indivisible items to a group of potential bidders. Each bidder has valuations over the items but might face a budget constraint and may therefore not be able to pay up to his values. In such markets, a competitive equilibrium typically fails to exist. We develop a novel dynamic auction and prove that the auction always ï¬ nds a core allocation. The core allocation consists of an assignment of the items and its associated supporting price vector and is Pareto efficient.

Keywords: Dynamic auction; multi-item auction; budget constraint; core; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders (2015)
Working Paper: An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders (2011)
Working Paper: An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:13/31

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