How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls?

Tommy Andersson, Zaifu Yang and Dongmo Zhang

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: Price controls are used in many regulated markets and well recognized as the cause of market inefficiency. This paper examines a practical housing market in the presence of price controls and provides a solution to the problem of how houses should be efficiently allocated among agents through a system of prices. We demonstrate that the dynamic auction by Talman and Yang (2008) always finds a core allocation in finitely many iterations, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient outcome.

Keywords: Ascending auction; assignment market; price control; Pareto efficiency; core. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D44 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2014/1405.pdf Main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls? (2015)
Working Paper: How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls? (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:14/05

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paul Hodgson ().