A Theory of Marriage with Mutually Consented Divorces

Ning Sun and Zaifu Yang

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: Abstract: We study a general model of marriage in which there are finitely many singles (unmarried men or women) and married couples. Singles wish to marry. Married couples can divorce and thus remarry as long as both parties will not be made worse off than they maintain the status quo. This is called mutual consent divorce. We examine the problem of how to make marriages between men and women as well as possible by allowing mutual consent divorce. We show the existence of a nonempty core of marriage matchings and also propose a finite procedure for finding a core matching. The procedure is a novel blend of modifications of two celebrated algorithms: the deferred acceptance procedure of Gale and Shapley (1962) and the top trading cycle method from Shapley and Scarf (1974).

Keywords: Marriage; core; stability; mutual consent divorce; partial commitment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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