On Public Education Spending under Nonlinear Income Taxation
Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York
This paper examines a model in which public education spending is skill specific. It may be directed towards low-skill or high-skill individuals, increasing their respective skills and wages. Education spending is financed by nonlinear income taxation. We show that the tax and education-spending policy most preferred by low-skill individuals may include more education spending for high-skill individuals than for themselves. The tax and education-spending policy most preferred by high-skill individuals has no spending on education for low-skill individuals. Our results provide support for previous findings that education policy should favour the high-skilled, despite the government's redistributive goals.
Keywords: Public education; nonlinear income; taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:18/07
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