Voter Turnout and Intergenerational Redistribution
Mickael Melki and
Andrew Pickering ()
Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York
Electoral reforms that lead to reduced turnout modify the composition of the electorate, potentially overrepresenting specific interests in policy implementation. Intergenerational redistribution tilts in favor of the elderly when they are sufficiently numerous, but in favor of the young rich otherwise. We exploit a natural experiment provided by the repeal of compulsory voting in Austrian parliamentary elections to study how exogenous turnout decline affects intergenerational redistribution through pro-young public education spending in Austrian municipalities. Empirically, education spending falls when the proportion of elderly voters exceeds 21% of the electorate, but rises when the proportion of elderly voters is below this threshold.
Keywords: Voter turnout; Education spending; Compulsory voting; Intergenerational conflict. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 I2 J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-cdm, nep-eur and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Voter turnout and intergenerational redistribution (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:18/10
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