The uncovered set and the core: Cox's (1987) result revisited
Victoria Brosi and
Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York
In this work first it is shown that in contradiction to the well-known claim in Cox (1987) (repeated in a number of subsequent works), the uncovered set in a multidimensional spatial voting situation (under the usual regularity conditions) does not necessarily coincide with the core even when the core is singleton: in particular, the posited coincidence result, while true for an odd number of voters, may cease to be true when the number of voters is even. Then we provide a characterization result for the case with even number of voters: a singleton core is the uncovered set in this case if and only if the unique element in the core is the Condorcet winner.
Keywords: Spatial Voting Games; Uncovered set; Core; Stable Set. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
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