Equilibrium in the Assignment Market under Budget Constraints

Gerard van der Laan, Adolphus Talman and Zaifu Yang

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: We reexamine the well-known assignment market model in a more general and more practical environment where agents may be financially con- strained. These constraints will be shown to have an important impact on the set of Walrasian equilibria. We prove that a price adjustment process will ei- ther find a unique minimal Walrasian equilibrium price vector, or exclusively validate the nonexistence of equilibrium.

Keywords: Divorce; Assignment; Auction; Budget Constraint; Walrasian Equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Equilibrium in the Assignment Market under Budget Constraints (2018)
Working Paper: Equilibrium in the Assignment Market under Budget Constraints (2018)
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