Efficient Sequential Assignments with Randomly Arriving Multi-Item Demand Agents
Dinard van der Laan and
Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York
A seller has several heterogeneous indivisible items like tickets to sell over time before a deadline. These items become worthless after the deadline. Buyers arrive sequentially and randomly and have their own private valuations over items. Each buyer may acquire more than one item. We formulate this as an incentive compatible revenue maximization problem and characterize optimal allocation policies and derive various properties.
Keywords: Revenue Maximization; Random and Sequential Assignment; Heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D21 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:19/13
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