Generalized Cumulative Offer Processes

Inacio Bo, Jörgen Kratz and Makoto Shimoji

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: In the context of the matching-with-contracts model, we generalize the cumulative offer process to allow for arbitrary subsets of doctors to make proposals in each round. We show that, under a condition on the hospitals' choice functions, the outcome of this generalized cumulative offer process is independent of the sets of doctors making proposals in each round. The flexibility of the resulting model allows it to be used to describe different dynamic processes and their final outcomes

Keywords: Matching with contracts; cumulative offer mechanism; asynchrony; order independence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-ore
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Journal Article: Generalized cumulative offer processes (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:21/07

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