Proper Exclusion Right, Priority and Allocation of Positions

Yao Cheng, Zaifu Yang and Jingsheng Yu

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: Multiple positions will be allocated to a group of individuals without side payments. Every individual has preferences over the positions, can have at most one position and may behave strategically. The right of using each position relies on individuals' given priorities. We propose a new solution called the proper exclusion right core which always guarantees to have precisely one solution. The solution is efficient, weakly and properly fair, can be supported by competitive prices and easily found by a procedure in a strategy-proof way. It is built on a novel exclusion right system that respects priorities and maximizes self-consistent exclusion rights.

Keywords: Core; proper exclusion right; indivisibility; incentive; top trading cycle. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D02 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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