A Universally Efficient Dynamic Auction for All Unimodular Demand Types

Satoru Fujishige and Zaifu Yang

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: We propose a novel strategy-proof dynamic auction for efficiently allocating heterogeneous indivisible commodities. The auction applies to all unimodular demand types of Baldwin and Klemperer’s necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of competitive equilibrium which accommodate a variety of complements, substitutes, gross substitutes and complements, and any other kinds. Although bidders are not assumed to be price-takers so they can act strategically, this auction induces bidders to bid truthfully, yielding efficient outcomes. Sincere bidding is shown to be an ex post perfect Nash equilibrium of the auction. The trading rules are simple, detail-free, privacy-preserving, error-tolerant, and independent of any probability distribution assumption.

Keywords: Dynamic Auction Design; Equilibrium; Incentive Compatibility; Unimodular Demand Types; Indivisibility; Incomplete Information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2025/2502.pdf Main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:25/02

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paul Hodgson ().