Modeling and Measuring Russian Corporate Governance: The Case of Russian Preferred and Common Shares (English version)

William Goetzmann, Matthew I. Spiegel () and Andrey Ukhov ()
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Matthew I. Spiegel: Yale School of Management, International Center for Finance
Andrey Ukhov: Yale School of Management

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: This paper examines governance explanations for the discount of preferred shares to common shares in the Russian market. Conflicts between shareholder classes may help explain the discount. However, for this to be the sole explanation the estimated models suggest that the magnitude of future adverse shareholder events would have to be very high. Nevertheless, evidence of a common factor potentially related to governance seems evident in the data, implying that corporate control issues may at least be partially responsible for the observed preferred share discount.

JEL-codes: F3 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-03-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-dev, nep-rmg and nep-tra
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Modeling and Measuring Russian Corporate Governance: The Case of Russian Preferred and Common Shares (English Version) (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm25

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