Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work?

Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: n a simple model of currency crises caused by creditor coordination failure, we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes create ex ante moral hazard but will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take preventative actions. This model helps us understand a debate about the role of the IMF in catalyzing lending to developing countries.

Keywords: Moral Hazard; Financial Crisis; International Financial Architecture; Global Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Catalytic finance: When does it work? (2006)
Working Paper: Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work? (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm339

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