Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry

Martijn Cremers, Joost Driessen, Pascal Maenhout and David Weinbaum

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: We use a unique database on the ownership stakes and compensation of equity mutual fund directors to analyze whether the directors' incentive structure is related to fund performance. We find that governance plays an economically substantial and statistically significant role. The ownership stakes of both independent and non-independent directors matter for fund performance. Further, the various governance variables interact: funds with high director ownership outperform those with low director ownership only w

Date: 2005-03-01, Revised 2008-11-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:wpaper:amz2470

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