Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund Registration

Stephen Brown (), William Goetzmann, Bing Liang and Christopher Schwarz

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: Mandatory disclosure is a regulatory tool intended to allow market participants to assess operational risk. We examine the value of disclosure through the controversial SEC requirement, since overturned, which required major hedge funds to register as investment advisors and file Form ADV disclosures. Leverage and ownership structures suggest that lenders and equity investors were already aware of operational risk. However, operational risk does not mediate flow-performance relationships. Investors either lack this information or regard it as immaterial. These findings suggest that regulators should account for the endogenous production of information and the marginal benefit of disclosure to different investment clienteles.

Keywords: Hedge funds; operational risk; SEC filing; Form ADV (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G2 K2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07-21, Revised 2009-09-11
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Journal Article: Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund Registration (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:wpaper:amz2472

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