Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from Acquisition Activity

Lily Qiu

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: This paper shows that the presence of large public pension fund shareholders particularly reduces acquisitions by cash-rich and low-q firms, and by firms seeking to ``buy growth'', after controlling for ownership endogeneity, firm-level governance structure, and other firm characteristics. When firms with large public pension fund presence do acquire other firms, they perform relatively better in the long-run. Other institutional investors have either the opposite effect or no effect.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Mergers and Acquisitions; Institutional Investors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-04-01, Revised 2006-06-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:wpaper:amz2497

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