More Social Security, Not Less

William Goetzmann

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: This paper explores the feasibility of a government-sponsored insurance company, patterned after the government-sponsored mortgage agencies, that would be authorized to sell government-insured wage-indexed retirement annuities. This enterprise would assume the current obligations and cash flows of the social security system in exchange for the exclusive right to sell additional insurance contracts. It may or may not choose to finance itself through the issuance of equity shares. The empirical analysis in the paper focuses on the stochastic nature of the liabilities faced by such an agency and in particular examines the optimal portfolio of assets required to hedge wage-indexed liabilities.

Keywords: Social Security; Wage Inedexation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-04-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.som.yale.edu/icfpub/publications/2631.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:wpaper:ysm449

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().