Measuring Fine-Based Competition Authority Activity Efficiency in CEE Countries

Marko Družić ()
Additional contact information
Marko Družić: Ekonomski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu

No 2603, EFZG Working Papers Series from Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb

Abstract: This paper examines the activity efficiency of competition authorities in Central and Eastern European countries by developing a simple, externally verifiable fine-to-budget indicator. The study focuses on the directly measurable segment of competition authority activity: competition-related fines imposed in the areas of abuse of dominance, cartels, and merger violations, relative to the budget allocated to competition-related activities. Using a novel dataset constructed from national competition authority reports and OECD submissions, the paper compares seven CEE countries - Croatia, Czechia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia - over the period 2014–2023. The results reveal substantial heterogeneity across the region. Croatia and Slovenia display low fine-based activity-efficiency levels, while Czechia, Poland, and Slovakia exhibit relatively high and stable performance. Latvia and Lithuania also show high average ratios, but with greater variability, indicating more episodic enforcement patterns.

Keywords: competition authority; enforcement activity; fine-to-budget ratio; competition policy; CEE countries; institutional efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 2026-07-21
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://web.efzg.hr/repec/pdf/Clanak%2026-04.pdf First version, 2026 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zag:wpaper:2604

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in EFZG Working Papers Series from Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by WPS ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).