Performance and capital structure of privatized firms in the european union
Patricia Bachiller () and
María José Arcas
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Patricia Bachiller: Departamento de Contabilidad y Finanzas. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Universidad de Zaragoza.
María José Arcas: Departamento de Contabilidad y Finanzas. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Universidad de Zaragoza.
Documentos de Trabajo from Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Zaragoza
The objective of this paper is to analyze whether there are differences in performance between firms that have been privatized and private firms in the EU. We also analyze whether previous ownership (state-owned versus private) and regulation affect capital structure. Focusing on economic reasons that justify privatizations, we compare the differences in the profitability, leverage and labor intensity of privatized firms in the EU countries with a matched-pairs sample of private firms, during the period 1999-2002. For the total sample, we have found evidence that privatized firms are more profitable, less leveraged and more efficient than private firms. With respect to capital structure, for the total sample, privatization and regulation determine leverage, being the privatized firms less leveraged and the regulated firms more leveraged. However, we have found important differences between zones.
Keywords: privatization; efficiency; capital structure; European Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 L33 L43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zar:wpaper:dt2006-02
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