Subjective educational mismatch and signalling in Spain
Inmaculada García-Mainar () and
Victor Montuenga ()
Documentos de Trabajo from Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Zaragoza
Over-education may arise from the voluntary decisions of individuals to acquire more qualifications than those required in the workplace. In these cases, the mismatch may have a signalling role that allows workers to compensate for the lack of certain other skills, or to gain access to the labour market. The aim of this paper is to analyse the signalling role of over-education in Spain, a country characterised by a strongly-segmented labour market with high unemployment levels, and a large number of over-educated individuals. Using micro data for a representative sample of Spanish workers, we use three different methods to test the signalling value of over-education. The results obtained provide evidence that educational mismatch plays a clear signalling role.
Keywords: human capital; educational mismatch; rate of return; signalling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 I26 J24 J28 J62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-eur and nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zar:wpaper:dt2017-03
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