Actuarial neutrality and financial incentives for early retirement in the Austrian pension system

Michael Christl and Dénes Kucsera

No 1, Working Papers from Agenda Austria

Abstract: This paper studies actuarial neutrality in the Austrian pension system. It is often argued that actuarial neutrality constitutes an incentive for people to retire. We show that there are almost no financial incentives within the Austrian pension corridor when we use the traditional definition of actuarial neutrality. Taking taxation into account, our results suggest that financial incentives for early retirement stem mainly from the Austrian tax system and not from the pension system itself.

Keywords: Actuarial neutrality; early retirement; pension system; Austria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H55 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age and nep-pbe
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/163558/1/agenda-austria-wp-01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Actuarial Neutrality and Financial Incentives for Early Retirement in the Austrian Pension System (2019)
Working Paper: Actuarial neutrality and financial incentives for early retirement in the Austrian pension system (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:agawps:01

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Agenda Austria Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().