Theoretical and Computational Basis for CATNETS - Annual Report Year 2

Torsten Eymann, Werner Streitberger, Daniel Veit, Georg Buss, Björn Schnizler and Dirk Neumann

No 9, Bayreuth Reports on Information Systems Management from University of Bayreuth, Chair of Information Systems Management

Abstract: In this work the self-organising potential of the CATNETS allocation mechanism is described to provide a more comprehensive view on the research done in this project. The formal description of either the centralised and decentralised approach is presented. Furthermore the agents' bidding model is described and a comprehensive overview on how the catallactic mechanism is incorporated into the middleware and simulator environments is given.

Keywords: Decentralized Market Mechanisms; Centralized Market Mechanisms; Catallaxy; Market Engineering; Simulator Integration; Prototype Integration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bayism:9

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