European banks are not immune to national elections
Zuzana Fungáčová,
Eeva Kerola and
Laurent Weill
No 4/2024, BOFIT Discussion Papers from Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT)
Abstract:
We investigate whether European banks adjust their loan prices and volumes of new lending in the months running up to major national elections. Using a unique dataset that draws on data covering some 250 banksin 19 Eurozone countries from 2010 to 2020 at monthly frequency, and that includes lending amounts and interest rates on new lending, we find that European banks increase loan rates for corporate and housing loans ahead of elections. This supports the view that loan pricing changes of European banks are driven by the electoral uncertainty inherent to the democratic election process. We find that the impact of elections is more pronounced for small banks, as well as obtain some evidence that elections affect the credit supply of banks. Our findings suggest that the occurrence of elections is affecting the behavior of European banks.
Keywords: bank; lending; politics; elections; political uncertainty; loan pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 E37 E44 F34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-eec, nep-fdg, nep-ifn and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bofitp:284402
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