Political cycles of media repression

Günther Schulze and Nikita Zakharov

No 3/2023, BOFIT Discussion Papers from Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT)

Abstract: We analyze media repression in Putin's Russia (2004-2019), a smart dictatorship that mimics democratic institutions, notably relatively free elections, and a relatively free press. Drawing on a unique granular dataset on journalist harassment and the pre-determined, staggered timing of local elections, we find evidence of strong political cycles of media repression. This media repression ahead of elections leads to a more favorable tonality of the news coverage of incumbents. Free press and free elections are temporally decoupled, thus disallowing them to work as effective accountability mechanisms. This secures dictator's power while upholding an image of competence and democratic rule.

Keywords: Authoritarian government; smart dictatorships; media repression; political election cycles; media tonality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H10 P43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cis, nep-pol and nep-tra
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bofitp:32023

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