An analysis of the German university admissions system

Alexander Westkamp

No 02/2012, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Abstract: This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be characterized by a \emph{stability} condition that is adapted to the \emph{institutional constraints} of the German system. I introduce \emph{matching problems with complex constraints} and the notion of \emph{procedural stability}. Two simple assumptions guarantee existence of a student optimal procedurally stable matching mechanism that is strategyproof for students. n the context of the German admissions problem, this mechanism weakly Pareto dominates all equilibrium outcomes of the currently employed procedure. Applications to school choice with affirmative action are also discussed.

Keywords: University Admissions; Matching; Stability; Strategyproofness; Complex Constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bonedp:022012

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