When Queueing is Better than Push and Shove

Alex Gerskov and Paul Schweinzer

No 10/2006, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Abstract: We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of mechanisms allows us to form efficient queues provided that existing property rights for the service are small enough to enable trade between the agents. In particular, we show on the one hand that no queue under a fully deterministic service schedule such as first-come, first-serve can be dissolved efficiently and meet our requirements. If, on the other hand, the alternative is service anarchy (ie. a random queue), every existing queue can be transformed into an efficient order.

Keywords: Scheduling; Queueing; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Journal Article: When queueing is better than push and shove (2010)
Working Paper: When queueing is better than push and shove (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bonedp:102006

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