Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption

Klaus Abbink

No 1/2000, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Abstract: In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.

Keywords: Corruption; reciprocity; fairness; public sector salaries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D62 D72 D73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bonedp:12000

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