Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Kyle Model with Multiple Informed Traders

Georg Nöldeke and Thomas Tröger
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Thomas Troeger

No 1/2001, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Abstract: We consider Kyle's market order model of insider trading with multiple informed traders and show: if a linear equilibrium exists for two different numbers of informed traders, asset payoff and noise trading are independent and have finite second moments, then these random variables are normally distributed.

Keywords: insider trading; Kyle model; linear equilibrium; normal distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D82 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Existence of linear equilibria in the Kyle model with multiple informed traders (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bonedp:12001

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