Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment

Klaus Abbink and Heike Hennig-Schmidt

No 23/2002, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Abstract: This paper contributes to the ongoing methodological debate on context-free versus in-context presentation of experimental tasks. We report an experiment using the paradigm of a bribery experiment. In one condition, the task is presented in a typical bribery context, the other one uses abstract wording. Though the underlying context is heavily loaded with negative ethical preconceptions, we do not find significant differences. We conjecture that the experimental design transmits the essential features of a bribery situation already with neutral framing, such that the presentation does not add substantially to subjects' interpretation of the task.

Keywords: Corruption; context; framing; valence; experimental instructions; laboratory; trust; reciprocity; ethical behaviour; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D62 D72 D73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Journal Article: Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bonedp:232002

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