An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for the British 3G / UMTS Auction

Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch, Paul Pezanis-Christou, Bettina Rockenbach, Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Reinhard Selten

No 25/2001, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Abstract: In spring 2000, the British government auctioned off licences for Third Generation mobile telecommunications services. In the preparation of the auction, two designs involving each a hybrid of an English and a sealed-bid auction were suggested by the government: a discriminatory and a uniform price variant. We report an experiment on these two designs, and also compare the results to those with a pure English auction. Both hybrids are similar in efficiency, revenue differences disappear as bidders get experienced. Compared to the discriminatory format, the pure English auction gives new entrants better chances.

Keywords: Spectrum auctions; UMTS; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction (2007)
Journal Article: An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction (2005)
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