How Payment Systems Affect Physicians' Provision Behaviour – An Experimental Investigation

Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Reinhard Selten and Daniel Wiesen

No 29/2009, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Abstract: A central concern in health economics is to understand the influence of commonly used physician payment systems. We introduce a controlled laboratory experiment to analyze the influence of fee-for-service (FFS) and capitation (CAP) payments on physicians' behaviour. Medical students decide as experimental physicians on the quantity of medical services. Real patients gain a monetary benefit from their choices. Our main findings are that patients are overserved in FFS and underserved in CAP. Financial incentives are not the only motivation for physicians' quantity decisions, though. The patient benefit is of considerable importance as well. Patients are affected differently by the two payment systems. Those patients in need of a low level of medical services are better off under CAP, whereas patients with a high need of medical services gain more health benefit when physicians are paid by FFS.

Keywords: Physician payment system; laboratory experiment; incentives; fee-for-service; capitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: How payment systems affect physicians' provision behaviour--An experimental investigation (2011)
Working Paper: How Payment Systems Affect Physicians' Provision Behaviour – An Experimental Investigation (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bonedp:292009

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