Submodularity and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior

Burkhard Schipper

No 4/2003, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Abstract: Vega-Redondo (1997) showed that imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome in Cournot Oligopoly. We generalize his result to aggregative quasi-submodular games. Examples are the Cournot Oligopoly, Bertrand games with differentiated complementary products, Common- Pool Resource games, Rent-Seeking games and generalized Nash-Demand games.

Keywords: imitation; price-taking behavior; lattice theory; stochastic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D21 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Journal Article: Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior (2004)
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