Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers be Published?

Volker Hahn and Hans Gersbach

No 2001,02, Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies from Deutsche Bundesbank

Abstract: We examine whether it is socially beneficial for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when the general public is unsure about central bankers' efficiency and central bankers are aiming for re-election. We show that publication is initially harmful since somewhat less efficient central bankers attempt to imitate highly efficient central bankers in their bid to get re-elected. After re-election, however, losses will be lower when voting records are published since the government is more easily able to distinguish highly efficient from less efficient central bankers and can make central bankers individually accountable. Nevertheless, the negative effects of voting transparency predominate and expected overall losses are always larger when voting records are published.

Date: 2001
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Related works:
Journal Article: Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published? (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:4148

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