Who is afraid of political risk? Multinational firms and their choice of capital structure

Iris Kesternich and Monika Schnitzer ()

No 2009,02, Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies from Deutsche Bundesbank

Abstract: This paper investigates how multinational firms choose the capital structure of their foreign affiliates in response to political risk. We focus on two choice variables, the leverage and the ownership structure of the foreign affiliate, and we distinguish different types of political risk, such as expropriation, unreliable intellectual property rights and confiscatory taxation. In our theoretical analysis we find that, as political risk increases, the ownership share tends to decrease, whereas leverage can both increase or decrease, depending on the type of political risk. Using the Microdatabase Direct Investment of the Deutsche Bundesbank, we find supportive evidence for these different effects.

Keywords: Multinational firms; political risk; capital structure; leverage; ownership structure; foreign affiliates (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 F23 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Who is afraid of political risk? Multinational firms and their choice of capital structure (2010)
Working Paper: Who is afraid of political risk? Multinational firms and their choice of capital structure (2010)
Working Paper: Who is Afraid of Political Risk? Multinational Firms and their Choice of Capital Structure (2007)
Working Paper: Who is Afraid of Political Risk? Multinational Firms and their Choice of Capital Structure (2007)
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