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Competition for internal funds within multinational banks: Foreign affiliate lending in the crisis

Cornelia Düwel and Rainer Frey

No 19/2012, Discussion Papers from Deutsche Bundesbank

Abstract: We investigate how the lending activities of a multinational bank's affiliates located abroad are affected by funding difficulties in view of the financial crisis. For this, we consider transaction-induced changes in long-term lending to the private sector of 40 countries by the affiliates of the 68 largest German banks. We find that affiliates' local deposits and profitability have been stabilizing loan supply. By contrast, relying on short-term wholesale funding has increasingly proven to be a disadvantage in the crisis, as inter-bank and capital markets froze. Besides, the more an affiliate abroad takes recourse to intra-bank funding in the crisis, the more it becomes dependent on a stable deposit and long-term wholesale funding position of its parent bank. We furthermore detect competition for intra-bank funding across the affiliates abroad as well as an increasing focus on the parent bank's home market activities.

Keywords: funding structure; multinational banks; internal capital market; intra-bank lending; wholesale funding; financial crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 F23 F34 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba and nep-ifn
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bubdps:192012

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