Do all new brooms sweep clean? Evidence for outside bank appointments

Thomas Kick, Inge Nehring and Andrea Schertler ()

No 27/2017, Discussion Papers from Deutsche Bundesbank

Abstract: Banks in bad financial shape are more likely to appoint executive directors from the outside than those in good shape. It is, however, not clear whether all of these appointments necessarily lead to the desired turnaround. We analyze the performance effects of new board members with external boardroom experience (outsiders) by distinguishing between good and bad managerial abilities of executives based on either ROA or risk-return effciency of their previous employers. Our results show that banks appointing bad outsiders underperform other banks while those appointing good outsiders do so to a lesser extent. The performance differentials are highly pronounced in high-risk banks and in the post-crisis period.

Keywords: executive directors; outside appointments; bank performance; managerial ability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 G21 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-cfn
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bubdps:272017

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